How will it end? That’s the real question after bombing Iran.
Whether this strike will stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon is a military assessment. The political assessment, however, must consider multiple other consequences.
I have drawn two lessons from decades of military service that began with Vietnam and ended with Afghanistan and Iraq: Militaries can stop a problem, but they won’t fix a problem.
And before you begin, know how it will end.
Few would venture that the Vietnam War was wise or ended well; that the Iraq War wasn’t a tragic misadventure as it removed the checkmate (Saddam Hussein) that kept Iran from terrorizing the Middle East, creating a globally metastasized Islamic State (ISIS); and that we left Afghanistan no different than before the war began, despite hunting down Osama bin Laden.
President Donald Trump has now made his decision to strike Iran, pressed by some international and domestic leaders, while others cautioned time for diplomacy to work.
The “problem” he faced — of his own making — was that the U.S. unilaterally withdrew in 2018 from the nuclear accord with Iran that prevented it from building a nuclear weapon. So Iran reassembled its capability to produce enough fissile material to make into nuclear bombs.
Recently, Israel had damaged or destroyed a number of facilities that enrich nuclear material in Iran — but not the Fordo facility, deeply buried and protected within a mountain.
America has the only “bunker-buster” conventional bomb for such a mission (the GBU-57 that penetrates deep before exploding), presenting Trump with a decision on its use.
During my assignments in the National Security Council’s defense policy office, and within the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s politico-military assessment group, war-gaming possible outcomes of probable conflicts, I experienced how military and political consequences of a commander in chief’s decision are assessed.
It starts with timing. In Fordo’s case, an acknowledgment that it would take months to a year to actually construct a nuclear warhead from the fissile material, and months to two years to integrate the warhead onto a ballistic missile to survive atmospheric re-entry after launch.
But after having rendered ineffective Hamas’ presence in Gaza and Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon — exerting control over Palestinians in the West Bank, and diminishing the odds of Syria turning to terror — Israel understood it had an opportunity to diminish what it considers an existential threat: Iran having a nuclear weapon. It needed America to strike Fordo, buried under 200-300 feet of rock and concrete, as its best guarantee to stop the threat.
“Will it stop the problem?” is a military assessment. The political assessment, on the other hand, is whether the strike will “fix” Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon or other military means of damaging capability.
This later assessment presents the possible consequences that help answer, “How will it end?”
The president must have determined that, despite the uncertainty of whether the deeply fortified Fordo facility would be destroyed or only be somewhat damaged by multiple bunker-buster bombs, it was sufficient to warrant a military strike to stop Fordo’s enrichment capabilities.
His political assessment of “how will it end” is unknown, but might have included consideration of these possibilities:
Iran can rebuild all its nuclear facilities within four years — unless America strikes again.
Iran could retaliate by using shorter-range missiles that are unable to reach Israel at Middle East U.S. bases and forces within range.
Iran could place mines in the Strait of Hormuz, bottling up around 20% of the world’s oil supply. A few miles ashore are hundreds of anti-ship missiles endangering minesweepers during the weeks or months it would take to demine the area — unless America expands the war to strike the missiles.
U.S. carrier strike groups would be unable — even in peacetime — to operate safely in the Persian Gulf because of concerns of being trapped inside by mines after entering, which could leave them vulnerable to Iran’s 20-plus midget submarines, which sonar cannot detect in the shallow water.
As carriers launch and recover aircraft on a reciprocal course, 12 hours each day, there are a few small — and well-known — areas deep enough for operations. Consequently, the untraceable Iranian submarines can lie on the gulf’s bottom waiting for the carrier to pass on top, with the ship also being vulnerable to the anti-ship land missiles ashore.
Houthi forces in Yemen could break their truce in targeting shipping and U.S. forces in the Red Sea, as they warned they would do, if America took part in striking Iran.
If the nuclear material inside Fordo hadn’t already been relocated, striking the facility has the possibility of releasing nuclear contamination.
Of gravest concern is that the nuclear material remaining from the bombed nuclear facilities could be used by Iran’s terrorist organizations to either smuggle nuclear reactor fuel or weapons-grade material into another nation, or traffic radioactive material as “dirty bombs” (a conventional explosive that disperses the radioactive material surrounding it).
Knowing the possible consequences of America’s military attack to “stop” Iran, there was time to effect a diplomatic accord and use other elements of our power as the means to permanently fix the problem.
However, perhaps our commander in chief realized how Iran might see the character of America’s leadership when it matters most: a government that, in 1953, overthrew Iran’s only democratic government, and a president — our current one — who broke America’s word on a nuclear accord that seemed a fix for the Iranian nuclear threat.
Joe Sestak is a former Navy vice admiral, a former U.S representative for Pennsylvania’s 7th Congressional District serving on the House Armed Services Committee, and a director for defense policy on the National Security Council staff.