Pilots are focus as NTSB hearings into fatal plane crash begin

The pilot in the Feb. 12 crash that killed 50 people near Buffalo had three seconds to make the right move in the frigid skies.

He didn't, and the Bombardier Q400 turboprop en route from Newark, N.J., plunged into a house five miles short of the runway, killing all 49 on board, and the homeowner.

The National Transportation Safety Board yesterday opened hearings into the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407 that could shed light on industry issues including pilot training and fatigue.

The transcript of the doomed flight's cockpit voice recorder, released yesterday, showed Captain Marvin Renslow, 47, and First Officer Rebecca Shaw, 24, worried about ice seven minutes from the airport.

Shaw asked: "Is that ice on our windshield? Oh, it's lots of ice."

Renslow: "Yeah, that's the most I've seen on the leading edges in a long time, in a while anyway."

As the plane descended to 4,000 feet with the autopilot on, Renslow and Shaw bantered casually. FAA rules and airline policy prohibit pilots from having nonessential conversations while flying below 10,000 feet.

Renslow remarked that he had flown about 625 hours before being hired by Colgan Air Inc., operator of the commuter flight for Continental.

Shaw: "I really wouldn't mind going through a winter in the Northeast before I have to upgrade to captain. I've never seen icing conditions. I've never deiced. I've never experienced any of that. . . . I'd have seen this much ice and thought, 'Oh my gosh, we were going to crash.' "

Renslow: "I would've been fine. I would have survived it. We never had to make decisions that I wouldn't have been able to make but . . . now I'm more comfortable."

The crew apparently did not notice that the plane's speed had dropped precipitously, and the plane risked going into a stall.

On approach toward Buffalo, Shaw adjusted the flaps and said the landing gear was down. At 10:16 p.m., the crew heard a sound similar to flap handle movement. "Uhhh," Shaw said.

A second later, the plane's slowing speed activated an emergency stall-warning system, called a stick shaker, warning the pilot of an imminent stall.

The stick shaker made a sound for 6.7 seconds, followed by a blaring horn that indicated the autopilot had disconnected.

"Jesus Christ," Renslow said.

Horn and stick-shaker sounds continued 25 more seconds until the plane crashed.

"I put the flaps up," said Shaw, and asked if she should put up the landing gear.

Renslow replied, "Gear up, oh [obscenity]."

The noise level rose in the cockpit.

"We're down," Renslow said. Then the sound of a thump.

Shaw: "We're (sound of scream)."

According to documents released as the safety board began a three-day hearing, Renslow had failed several test flights and did not have hands-on experience in the warning system that prevents a plane from going into a stall.

Colgan Air has acknowledged Renslow's training for the Dash 8 Q400 did not include a demonstration or simulation of the stick-pusher system.

The Manassas, Va.-based carrier, which shuttles 2.5 million passengers annually for major airlines, including Continental, United, and US Airways, said the FAA does not require a simulator demonstration.

Colgan said Renslow had the necessary training and experience to safely operate the Q400.

Colgan operates 39 daily flights for US Airways in New England and the Northeast. The carrier does not fly out of Philadelphia International Airport.

The stick-pusher emergency system pushes the control column down, pointing the aircraft in a temporary dive to pick up speed and recover from a stall.

Investigators said Renslow pulled back on the plane's controls, apparently trying to bring the aircraft out of the dive.

Allan Paige, Bombardier's lead engineer on the Q400, testified that - even before the stick-pusher warning - a red dial or indicator would have come on, alerting the pilots to the dropping speed.

How much time did the pilots have to react to avoid the stall? asked NTSB member Deborah Hersman.

"The pilot has to take action three seconds after a warning to avoid stall," Paige responded.

In addition to lack of hands-on training for the emergency that led to the crash, Renslow failed four flight proficiency checks administered by the FAA. Three were before he was hired by Colgan in September 2005, according to testimony.

He subsequently passed training and competency tests. Colgan has said Renslow was fully qualified to fly the Q400.

The NTSB recommended two years ago that the FAA examine whether pilot training on stick-pushers should be improved.

Another topic at the hearing will be whether Shaw was suffering from congestion and was too fatigued to fly.

Shaw traveled the night before from Seattle, arriving in Memphis at 2:30 a.m. on the day of the accident. She then took a 4:20 a.m. flight to Newark, arriving at 6:30. Investigators said she sent and received text messages throughout that day, raising questions about how much sleep she got.

Moments before the crew observed ice, Shaw stated her ears were "stuffy."

"Are they poppin'?" Renslow asked.

"Yeah," she replied.

Other aircraft flying in Upstate New York that night reported light to moderate icing. The NTSB has said the Colgan plane was not significantly affected by ice accumulation.

The hearing continues through tomorrow.