Air crash finding: Pilot training was inadequate

LE BOURGET, France - The crew piloting a doomed Air France jet over the Atlantic did not realize it was in a stall, were insufficiently trained in flying manually, and never informed the passengers that anything was wrong before they plunged into the ocean, according to new findings released Friday.

Based on newly discovered cockpit recordings from the 2009 crash, the French air-accident investigation agency is recommending mandatory training for all pilots to help them fly planes manually and handle a high-altitude stall.

The findings show that Flight 447's two copilots faced faulty speed readings from unreliable sensors and repeated alarm signals, but fail to explain why the pilots responded the way they did.

All 228 people were killed when the Airbus 330, en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, crashed as thunderstorms hit over the Atlantic on June 1, 2009. It was the worst accident in Air France's history.

"The pilots were in a situation they didn't understand," investigator Alain Bouillard said at a news conference.

Questions also emerged about how the three pilots shared responsibilities in the flight's crucial final moments.

The French aviation investigation agency, known by its French acronym BEA, is forming a special group, including aviation experts and physiologists and psychologists, to study the pilots' possible responses to help determine why they did what they did.

The passengers were never told what was happening as Flight 447 went into an aerodynamic stall and then fell for 31/2 minutes into the ocean, according to the BEA.

Corinne Soulas, whose daughter Caroline, 24, and son-in-law were aboard the flight, said: "From what we've been told, nobody realized what was going on. On that level, for my mental and moral comfort I am very pleased to hear this, when you know you had two people on board who were dear to you."

The BEA released a 117-report Friday, based on cockpit voice and data recordings retrieved from the ocean depths in May. A final report is expected in early 2012.

The report confirms that external speed sensors obstructed by ice crystals produced irregular speed readings on the plane. Since the accident, Air France has replaced the speed monitors on all its Airbus A330 and A340 aircraft.

The BEA says neither of the copilots at the controls had received recent training for manual aircraft handling, or had any high-altitude schooling in case of unreliable air speed readings.

A stall warning sounded numerous times, and once for a full 54 seconds, but the crew made no reference to it in cockpit exchanges before the jet crashed, the BEA said.

John Goglia, a former U.S. National Transportation Safety Board member, said: "Aircraft have become so reliable that pilots rarely fly the airplane without all the automation helping them. Then when they get into unusual circumstances, the pilots are really in unfamiliar, unknown territory."

Pilots are required to fly with autopilot above 24,000 feet.

In a statement, Air France said there was no reason to question the crew's technical skills. It said the report showed that a series of unlikely failures led up to the crash.

The airline also suggested that the jet's systems and alarms may have "hindered the crew's understanding of the situation" during the stall, in comments possibly intended to shift some blame for the crash onto the Airbus itself.

Bill Voss, head of the Flight Safety Foundation, an independent advocate, said it would be a "tragic mistake" to blame only Air France and its training procedures.

"This is an industry problem," he said. ". . . A whole new generation of pilots have never had the chance to train on the real scenarios that will affect them in the real world."