ALBANY, N.Y. - More than three decades before Sandy hit, a state law and a series of legislative reports began warning New York politicians to prepare for a storm of historic proportions, spelling out scenarios eerily similar to what actually happened: A towering storm surge. Overwhelming flooding. Swamped subway lines. Widespread power outages. The Rockaways peninsula was deemed among the "most at risk."
But most of the warnings and a requirement in a 1978 law to create a regularly updated plan for the restoration of "vital services" after a storm were largely unheeded, either because of tight budgets or the lack of political will to prepare for a hypothetical storm.
Some of the thorniest problems after Sandy, including a gasoline shortage, the lack of temporary housing, and the flooding of commuter tunnels, ended up being dealt with largely on the fly.
"I don't know that anyone believed," acknowledged Gov. Andrew Cuomo last week. ". . . It is very hard to anticipate something that you have never experienced."
It wasn't as if the legislative actions over the years were subtle. They all had a common, emphatic theme: Act immediately before it's too late.
The 1978 executive law required a standing state Disaster Preparedness Commission to meet at least twice a year to create and update disaster plans. It mandated the state to address temporary housing needs after a disaster, create a detailed plan to restore services, maintain sewage treatment, prevent fires, assure generators "sufficient to supply" nursing homes and other health facilities, and "protect and assure uninterrupted delivery of services, medicines, water, food, energy and fuel."
Reports in 2005, 2006, and 2010 added urgency. "It's not a question of whether a strong hurricane will hit New York City," the 2006 Assembly report said. "It's just a question of when."
A 2010 task force report to the Legislature concluded: "The challenge is real, and sea level rise will progress regardless of New York's response."
The Disaster Preparedness Commission met biannually some years, but there are gaps in which there is no record of a meeting. However, some administrations, including Cuomo's, convened many of the same agency heads to discuss emergency management. But even under Cuomo, who has taken a great interest in emergency management after three violent storms in his first two years in office, there are three vacancies on the commission.
Richard Brodsky, a former New York Democratic assemblyman who was chairman of the committee that created the 2006 report, credits administrations with making some improvements to the plan in recent years, such as requiring a specific plan to protect and evacuate the infirmed and to save pets.
"But on two issues related to Sandy - prevention and recovery - they did almost nothing," Brodsky said. "If Goldman Sachs was smart enough to sandbag its building, why wasn't the MTA smart enough to sandbag the Battery Tunnel?"
Sandy flooded both tubes of the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel, now called the Hugh L. Carey Tunnel, one of the major and longest transportation disruptions.
There was another obstacle to enacting calls for more preparation: funding. The state and city were each facing $1 billion deficits from a slow economic recovery before Sandy hit.
"As your budget shrinks, the first thing that goes out the door is emergency management, the first thing," said Michael Balboni, New York's preparedness point man in the Republican-led Senate and in the Democratic Spitzer and Paterson administrations from 2001 to 2009.