Ruben Amaro isn't only one to blame for Phillies' woes

IT IS 88 STEPS from the Phillies' clubhouse to the executive elevators. About a year ago, Ruben Amaro Jr. made that walk with a reporter at his hip.

The reporter mentioned that few observers complained in the moment when Amaro, as general manager, committed hundreds of millions of dollars to aging players in the middle of the best run in team history. However, plenty of revisionists and second-guessers felt no compunction with crucifying him when those players faltered.

Amaro replied, "That's true. But I'll be judged on how productive we are. And I'm fine with that."

The final judgment came yesterday.

To the delight of most Phillies fans, pending president Andy MacPhail fired Amaro yesterday morning. Assistant GM Scott Proefrock will serve as an interim GM for the next few weeks. Amaro's contract was due to expire at the end of this season.

Amaro, 50, was in the final year of his contract, a lame duck for months, if not years. He made this bed, but he was not alone; and no one saw it coming until the disintegration was irreversible.

It's easy to kick a guy on his way out. It's much harder to be fair; to be sympathetic.

He signed older players to long, expensive, crippling contracts, contracts roundly celebrated at the time of their execution. All of those players quickly declined, mostly due to injury. He forfeited draft picks to sign free agents, then tried to replenish by making trades, which brought him poor return. He made unpopular trades that ultimately did not benefit the team.

At many turns, he failed.

At most turns, he was cursed.

Amaro banked on Ryan Howard and Chase Utley to return to healthy productivity, but injury and ineptness kept that from happening. Jimmy Rollins, a more modest expense, just got old.

Amaro expected Roy Halladay to win games through the 2014 season, but Halladay's injuries forced retirement by the end of 2013. Amaro expected Cliff Lee, who returned via free agency for 2011, to win through 2016, but Lee evaporated with Halladay.

There were other errors along the way; egregiously, the misevaluation of free-agent setup man Mike Adams, which crippled the bullpen for two seasons; and the overvaluing of Domonic Brown, an All-Star talent with part-time skills. Amaro, who feared losing Lee to free agency after the 2010 season, traded Lee after the 2009 season for prospects to replenish a system depleted by the trade the previous season for Lee, and prospects lost in the simultaneous trade for Halladay. The prospects from the Lee trade did not produce.

In the end, only Cole Hamels, Jonathan Papelbon and, of all people, Marlon Byrd performed to the level of their outsized deals. All have been traded for questionable return in the current rebuilding initiative.

It is an initiative delayed too long, said owner John Middleton; a result of successful businesses rejecting change as they ride the wave of their current successes.

Embracing that sort of change, said Middleton, is "a great risk."

He then referenced the first of Tiger Woods' swing changes, and the astounding success Woods enjoyed afterward. Then again, Middleton did not address the catastrophic results of Woods' most recent swing change.

Middleton repeatedly admitted that the fans' displeasure with Amaro in recent years, as well as Amaro's public criticism of the fans' intellect, factored into the decision:

"Their attitude is hugely important," Middleton said.

So is their attendance. Recent average crowds are half what they were during the halcyon days, when the Phillies surged to the forefront of the NL East.

A new GM might not sell tickets, but the retention of Amaro past this season might have been disastrous at the box office. Middleton was asked if he would have allowed MacPhail to extend Amaro's contract:

"Andy would have had to come and given me some compelling reasons," and even if MacPhail had done so, Middleton said, he might have replied: "I'm pulling rank on you."

Instead, after two months of observation MacPhail decided Amaro had to go. MacPhail will replace acting president Pat Gillick next month. MacPhail then will hire a general manager to do the legwork that will inform his final decisions; a process that began long ago, really.

The Phillies effectively fired Amaro when they put MacPhail in place in late June, so MacPhail could observe the organization's operations as it restructured itself, essentially emasculating the entire management corps — an absurd working condition to create. Nevertheless, MacPhail said, Amaro thrived.

"This was a much more difficult decision that I anticipated it would be," MacPhail said.

At least Amaro won't wake up in anyone's shadow today.

The shadow would not have been there had not bad scouting and drafting while they were on top put the Phillies in a position of weakness today. Surprisingly, Middleton said he expects MacPhail to retain much of the existing scouting and player-development staff.

To that point, the most costly development occurred when Amaro was abandoned by Mike Arbuckle. The assistant GM who built the Golden Era Phillies, Arbuckle was passed over in favor of Amaro when Gillick retired in 2008. Arbuckle led the brain trust that drafted and developed Rollins and Howard, players who won MVP awards despite not being first-round picks; that drafted Hamels in 2002 amid questions about Hamels' health and character; that wisely held on to Utley when Utley's path to the major leagues was blocked.

Arbuckle, wounded by the favoritism shown Amaro, bristled at working under an executive he helped train. So, Arbuckle went to Kansas City and has helped create a monster in the Midwest.

Perhaps if Aaron Nola, Maikel Franco, Ken Giles and Rule5 wonder Odubel Herrera become the new Jimmy, Chase, Ryan and Cole, Amaro's legacy will be better regarded.

"This organization is going to bear the fruit of his labor for years to come," said MacPhail.

Fairly or not, that is Amaro's only hope.

On Twitter: @inkstainedretch

Email: hayesm@phillynews.com