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Leaders must make responsible choice on Iran

By Joe Sestak The nuclear accord that major powers reached with Iran last week is a promising first step toward peacefully and permanently stopping the Iranians from attaining nuclear weapons.

By Joe Sestak

The nuclear accord that major powers reached with Iran last week is a promising first step toward peacefully and permanently stopping the Iranians from attaining nuclear weapons.

It is a result of painstaking diplomacy, made possible by principled American leadership and endorsed by the international community, and it provides a chance to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions while avoiding another costly war in the region.

Congress now must give this agreement a serious look. It should support the agreement - and then work with the administration to ensure that Iran lives up to its promise and, if not, is held to account.

Why should the American people give this accord a chance?

For once, we have an agreement - signed by the Iranians - that limits Iran's ability to research and develop nuclear weapons, reduces its nuclear stockpile by 98 percent, and mandates changes to its nuclear facilities.

Specifically, Iran will substantially reduce the number of centrifuges that can enrich uranium to a level below what is needed to produce bomb-grade materials. Tehran will also dilute its existing enriched uranium from a concentration level of 20 percent to below 4 percent (90 percent is considered bomb grade).

Today, Iran could produce nuclear-bomb-grade material in about 30 days. Under these new, strict limits, even if Iran were to pursue its nuclear ambition, it would not be able to achieve it for a year or more.

Iran will also stop all uranium enrichment activities at Fordow - a deep-underground facility that we cannot destroy nor have been able to inspect, until now - and use only one nuclear plant, Natanz, for civilian purposes. There, centrifuges will be limited to low-grade enrichment, using only first-generation centrifuges constructed in the 1970s.

At the sole Iranian heavy-water reactor, at Arak, all ability to produce bomb-grade plutonium will be eliminated, and nuclear research and development programs will be curtailed.

Perhaps most significantly, this deal allows the international community to impose meaningful inspections to confirm that Iran will not cheat - what President Ronald Reagan called "trust, but verify."

A number of respected nuclear experts, including prominent inspectors with decades of experience with challenging regimes like Iraq and North Korea, are impressed with the inspection safeguards in this agreement.

First, the number of inspectors dedicated to Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency will increase from 50 to about 150.

Second, Iran will allow international inspectors to install the latest, most advanced technology to conduct surveillance and monitor Iranian facilities. Satellite imagery, infrared and radar systems, and on-the-ground samples and lab tests will all be part of the new detection process.

Third, and perhaps most significant, Iran agreed to let inspectors visit sites and facilities that have been suspected of harboring secret nuclear weapons programs in the past. This will give us a more complete picture of Iran's activities and its seriousness in complying - then and now.

If Iran violates the terms, the agreement was crafted to allow for sanctions to be reinstated. If there is a new location found to have suspicious activity, there is a timely process in which Western powers - not Iran - dominate the approval process for access to suspicious sites.

There are those who have already stated that they will not support this deal. They have the right to challenge the administration. But as leaders, they also have a duty to present an alternative - and, in this case, what is the recourse?

Some suggest we cease negotiations and apply more sanctions to "cripple their economy." That argument fails to take into account that the Iranians were driven to take this deal only because China, Russia, and other nations have worked with us to enforce a comprehensive, international system of sanctions.

If our negotiations ceased and Russia or China walked away, the global consensus would fracture. Are we then willing to pursue war to try to achieve what this agreement does in halting Iran's nuclear program - keeping in mind that U.S. military strikes can delay a nuclear weapon for only a few years?

And if not war, are we prepared to see a nuclear arms race as Saudi Arabia works to procure a nuclear weapon? What is the endgame of those who oppose the deal?

This is a dangerous, challenging world, and building an effective national security strategy is hard. It requires patience, thoughtful diplomacy, and accountability on when to use force.

So as we assess this deal, let's focus on the delicate balance that the accord brings.

If we pursue this, we will improve our security by at least a year, if not at least 15, with renewed sanctions and military action always available if cheating occurs. If not, we will likely see a regional nuclear arms race or perhaps a war with no exit strategy.

Our leaders must make the responsible decision.